PRIOR JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA
Name: POLYANNA RODRIGUES ALVES BARBOSA
Publication date: 26/05/2026
Examining board:
Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| GEOVANY CARDOSO JEVEAUX | Examinador Interno |
| JOSÉ LEVI MELLO DO AMARAL JÚNIOR | Examinador Externo |
| MARIA CLARA MENDONÇA PERIM | Examinador Externo |
| RICARDO GUEIROS BERNARDES DIAS | Presidente |
Summary: The research examines the context of constitutional review concerning international treaties
concluded by the Brazilian State from a comparative perspective based on the model adopted
in Colombia. Its starting point is the observation that Brazil lacks a mechanism of prior
judicial constitutional review of international treaties, which allows international norms to be
incorporated into the domestic legal order and subsequently declared unconstitutional by the
Brazilian Supreme Federal Court. This scenario produces a dual effect: on the one hand, it
undermines domestic legal certainty and normative stability; on the other, it weakens the
international credibility of the Brazilian State. In light of this context, the research proposes a
lege ferenda solution inspired by the Colombian model and adapted to the Brazilian
constitutional framework, whereby international treaties concluded by the Head of
Government would be subject to mandatory prior judicial constitutional review after approval
by the National Congress and before ratification by the President of the Republic, without
replacing the political decision-making process of the competent branches of government. The
material limits of judicial review would consist of the analysis of the compatibility of treaties
with entrenched constitutional clauses and sensitive constitutional principles. The
methodology adopted is doctrinal in nature, with a comparative approach grounded in
specialized scholarship in Constitutional Law, Public International Law, and Procedural Law,
as well as in the case law of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court and the Colombian
Constitutional Court. Ultimately, the research seeks to address the existing normative gap by
expanding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court through the establishment of material limits
designed to ensure judicial self-restraint, so that constitutional review does not encroach upon
the powers of the other branches of government, but instead operates as an additional
mechanism within the system of checks and balances.
